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Facilitating Transitional Processes in Rigid Institutional Regimes for
Water Management and Wetland Conservation: Experience from the
Guadalquivir Estuary
Pablo F. Méndez 1, Nicola Isendahl 2, Jaime M. Amezaga 3, and Luis Santamaría 1
ABSTRACT. Traditional policies for water resources management and wetland conservation are often based on command-and-
control approaches. The latter tend to drive the human–wetland–water system into pathological states, characterized by more
vulnerable ecosystems and rigid institutions for governance. The overcoming of these states may rest in the development of
flexible and adaptive institutional regimes that rely on adaptive governance and management. Because past factors might constrain
the implementation of more flexible adaptive approaches to management, it is important to understand the historical mechanisms
underlying the genesis of institutional rigidity. We first present the results of a historical analysis of Doñana, which can be
characterized as a pathological water socio-ecosystem governed through rigid institutional regimes for water resources
management and wetland conservation. In a second step, we analyze the advances achieved during a recent, large-scale restoration
program for the Doñana wetlands, which adhered explicitly to the tenets of adaptive management. Our analysis indicated that
the historical persistence of command-and-control approaches has been a path-dependent process that led to the emergence of
a rigid institutional regime and caused it to enter a rigidity trap. However, the achievements of the restoration program suggest
that a more flexible and adaptive regime could be developed through the introduction of adaptive management at the operational
levels, using specifically tailored action research programs. To conclude, we speculate that the research strategy outlined could
be extended to comply with, or complement, the requirements of the EU's Water Framework Directive in other European water
socio-ecosystems.
Key Words: action research; adaptive cycle; adaptive management; command and control; Doñana; Guadalquivir Estuary;
path dependence; rigid institutional regimes; Water Framework Directive
INTRODUCTION
Wetland ecosystems provide essential services to society, such
as water storage, purification and supply, flood mitigation and
erosion control, and stabilization of local climate conditions
(Ramsar Convention Secretariat 2006). Hence, the sustainable
use and management of wetlands and water resources is a
widely acknowledged need (Davis and Froend 1999, Amezaga
and Santamaría 2000, Folke 2003, Gleick 2003, Zedler and
Kercher 2005, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2006,
Vadineanu and Preda 2008). However, current policies for
water resource management and wetland conservation (WRM
and WC hereafter) are most often based upon the recurrent
application of panaceas (e.g., blueprint solutions) that obviate
the complex, variable, and uncertain nature of wetland
ecosystems (Carpenter et al. 1999, Arrow et al. 2000, Scheffer
et al. 2001, Brock and Carpenter 2007, Meinzen-Dick 2007).
Such panaceas operate under two implicit assumptions: (1) a
predictable biophysical world in static equilibrium, and (2)
productivity can be maximized infinitely through the
minimization of the effects of natural variability and the
simplification, centralization, and compartmentalization of
management operations (after Costanza et al. 1993, Carpenter
and Gunderson 2001, Folke et al. 2005, Ostrom 2009, Pahl-
Wostl 2009). At their core, these types of policies are based
on top-down, unique target command-and-control approaches
that, although sometimes leading to short-term improvements,
ultimately drive the whole human–wetland–water system into
undesirable, pathological states characterized by: (1) more
vulnerable, i.e., less resilient, aquatic ecosystems, (2) rigid
institutions for governance, distrusted by local societies, and
(3) economies that become highly dependent on limited sets
of resources (sensu Holling and Meffe 1996, Olsson et al.
2006, Beier et al. 2009).  
To overcome these constraints, two factors must converge.
Firstly, because humans are crucial components of the system
and directly affect its trajectory, the coupled and complex
nature of human institutions, wetlands ecosystems, and water
resources must be recognized, and such understanding
incorporated into operative policies, for example through their
conceptualization as integrated water socio-ecosystems
(WSES hereafter) (after Anderies et al. 2004, Berkes et al.
2003, Janssen et al. 2007, Norberg and Cumming 2008).
Secondly, the creation of more flexible and adaptive
institutional regimes in which reactive, command-and-control
responses to uncertainty and unpredictability are replaced by
proactive, structured, and informed decision making processes
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may require the gradual implementation of transitional
processes (Gunderson and Light 2006, Pahl-Wostl 2007).  
Such regimes are based on adaptive governance, an emergent
framework for the management of complex socio-ecosystems
aimed at integrating science, policy, and decision making
(Folke et al. 2005, Brunner et al. 2006). This framework
postulates the need for organizing governance around systems
of organizations, polycentric institutional arrangements, and
networks of individuals with self-organization and self-
enforcing capabilities, in order to achieve an optimal balance
between decentralized and centralized control (Folke et al.
2005). At the management and technical levels, they rely on
the implementation of adaptive management, a critical
component of adaptive governance that involves: (1)
continual, participatory processes aimed at rationally defining
problems and developing solutions, (2) structured
representation of knowledge and evaluation of scenarios by
means of dynamic models, and (3) identification of
uncertainties and alternative hypotheses to be tested through
a structured process of investigation, in which policy failure
is acknowledged as a source of learning (Holling 1978,
Walters and Hilborn 1978, Walters 1986, Lee 1993, Lee 1999,
Gregory et al. 2006, Polasky et al. 2011).  
In summary, while adaptive management aims to reduce our
ignorance by using direct management actions as experiments
to test implemented policies at the operational levels, adaptive
governance deals with the institutional barriers and
opportunities to the implementation of adaptive management
(Gunderson and Light 2006). Indeed, adaptive management
often encounters institutional factors (e.g., rules,
organizational structures, shared ideas and paradigms,
individual attitudes) that may undermine the chances of its
successful implementation (McLain and Lee 1996, Walters
1997, Gunderson 1999, Noble 2000, Lee 2003, Walkerden
2005, Marmorek et al. 2006, Folke et al. 2007, Méndez et al.
2010). This risk is particularly pronounced in pathological
WSES; hence, it is of utmost importance to understand both
their rigid institutional configuration and the historical
mechanisms underlying the genesis of rigidity, in order to
facilitate potential transitions to more flexible and adaptive
institutional regimes.  
As part of a wider, long-term research program, we present
the results of a historical institutional analysis of the Doñana
region, which we propose as a case study of pathological
WSES governed through rigid institutional regimes for WRM
and WC. We first outline the research program, its general
aims, and the specific objectives of the historical analysis.
Then we present the methods used, followed by the results,
which are presented as a systems narrative that synthesizes
our interpretation of the genesis and evolution of the
institutional regimes. In a second step of investigation, we
analyze and discuss the advances achieved during a recent,
large-scale restoration program for the Doñana wetlands,
which adhered explicitly to the tenets of adaptive
management. In the closure of the article, we speculate on the
potential extension of our research strategy to comply with,
or complement, the requirements of the European Union’s
Water Framework Directive at other European WSES, and
propose future research needs.
RESEARCH SITE AND OBJECTIVES
Doñana is located in the right bank of the Guadalquivir Estuary
(south-west Spain). During the last two centuries, the
Guadalquivir’s marsh and floodplain wetlands have been
modified by the intensification of agriculture and water
resource use, compounded in the last decades by accelerated
tourism, infrastructure, and urban development. The result is
a fragmented wetland that has lost most of its original
extension and complexity (Amezaga and Santamaría 2000,
Fernández and Pradas 2000a, Fernández-Delgado 2006,
García and Marín 2006, Méndez et al. 2010). Such changes,
along with other developments at the basin level (e.g.,
metalliferous mining, fluvial navigation), have bequeathed to
the region increasing environmental hazards, nature
conservation threats, and physical pressures (e.g.,
overextraction of groundwater, waterfowl mortalities,
biological invasions), as well as intricate conflicts in the social
realm (e.g., struggles with cattle and horse breeders, furtive
hunting, economic dependence on external subsidies)
(Amezaga and Santamaría 2000, González-Arteaga 2005,
Fernández-Delgado 2006, Tablado et al. 2010, Martín-López
et al. 2011, Palomo et al. 2011). Our long-term research
program paralleled the implementation of the large restoration
projects, “Guadiamar’s Green Corridor” and “Doñana 2005”,
launched in response to the accidental collapse of the tailings
dam of “Los Frailes” zinc mines in 1998 (Meharg et al. 1999,
Taggart et al. 2004). Both projects adhered explicitly to
adaptive management tenets (Montes 2002, García and Marín
2006, Santamaría et al. 2006). Our program focused on
identifying the institutional constraints and opportunities for
the full development of such tenets. 
Overall, the program aims to: (1) use historical and current
knowledge to understand and explain Doñana’s rigid
institutional regimes, (2) provide, on the basis of these results,
general policy guidance and specific recommendations for a
managed transition towards more flexible and adaptive
regimes, (3) carry out a coupled action-research program that
facilitates actor involvement in the potential transition, while
documenting and developing both. In particular, we wanted
to evaluate whether adaptive management could be introduced
at the regime’s operational levels, in particular, at the research–
management interface, and whether it represents a significant
avenue for the resolution of the long-standing conflict between
WRM and WC in the region.  
The specific objectives of the historical analysis presented in
this article were: 
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Table 1. Summary of methods.
Methodological approach Application to research Rationale of use Specific methods
Single case study Overall research program - Exploratory character of whole research program
- Representative case of pathological WSES
governed through a RIR, hence informative for
other pathological systems
- Generalization of results to theory, not to
populations (i.e., analytical generalization)
- Instrumental for the normative goal of
elaborating policy-relevant recommendations
- Replication if evidence is found in other cases
Embedded design (Yin 2008):
- Case study: Doñana WSES
- Context: Guadalquivir Estuary
- Three subunits of analysis: the hydro-
ecological system (not analyzed here) and
the institutional regimes for WRM and WC
(the focus of the present analysis)
Theoretical framework
development
Overall research program.
Circumscribed here to the
historical analysis
- Propositional conceptualization of RIR, liable to
empirical evaluation
- Guide analysis and inform interpretations,
departing from a reasoned selection of existing
theory
- Hypotheses derived deductively provide
framework with explanatory power
- Ground the inquiry in updated theory, allows for
a characterization of initial institutional conditions
and potential transitions
Inductive and deductive inference
procedures (see Thelen 1999 for a
description of the use of both procedures in
different institutionalism disciplines;
Campbell and Pedersen 2001 for the
application of both procedures in several
case studies using institutional analysis;
Holling and Allen 2002 for a depiction of
“adaptive inference” in ecology, a method
that employs both procedures at different
stages of empirical evidence evaluation)
Systems narrative Historical analysis Instrumental for:
- Understanding and describing the history and
genesis of the institutional regimes
- Addressing and embracing (vs. rejecting) the
inherent complexity of WSES
- Assessing theoretical framework applicability
- Evaluating h
1
- Informing future analyses of current institutional
configuration
- Data collection and categorization through
directed, deductive content analysis (see, e.
g., Hsieh and Shannon 2005)
- Data analysis and interpretation (see e.g.,
Allison and Hobbs 2004, Beier et al. 2009,
for different approaches to constructing a
systems narrative)
Action research Overall research program.
Informed by the historical
analysis
Instrumental for:
- Introducing new modes of actor involvement and
collaborative understanding of current institutional
problems
- Facilitating the long-term transition towards
more adaptive and flexible institutional regimes
- Gathering qualitative data for future analyses of
current institutional configuration (e.g.,
management narratives)
We employed the following methods (see
Appendix 2 for a detailed description):
- Actor identification (see e.g., Mostert
2006)
- Semi-structured, open-ended interviews
(Robson 2002)
- Workshops including: thematic talks,
facilitated discussion, and Group Model
Building (Vennix 1996) and Card Sorting
(Hare and Pahl-Wostl 2002) methods in
focus groups
● To understand and explain the genesis of institutional
rigidity in Doñana. 
● To assess the applicability of the theoretical framework
presented in the methods section. 
● To inform our action-research program (e.g., deriving
historical criteria for actor analysis from the historical
analysis), as well as future analyses about the current
configuration of the institutional regimes.
METHODS
The methodology employed in the historical analysis
consisted of the construction of a systems narrative
interpreting the genesis of Doñana’s institutional regimes for
WRM and WC and, in particular, of their rigidity. The next
sections describe the methods employed in our research
program, with a focus on the construction of the narrative (see
Table 1 for a summary).
Single case study research approach
We chose to analyze Doñana as a single case study because
(1) Doñana constituted a “critical case” (sensu Yin 2008:47)
to test the applicability of our theoretical framework; (2) this
approach was instrumental for accomplishing our long-term
goal of providing specific policy-relevant recommendations
for a managed transition in Doñana. As a consequence, our
results can be generalized to theory, not to “populations or
universes” (i.e., analytical generalization, Yin 2008:15).
Theory is used as a template with which to compare the
empirical results of the case study. Replication can be claimed
if evidence from two or more cases is shown to support such
theory (Yin 2008).
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Fig. 1. The Institutional Analysis and Development framework, applied to the Doñana water socio-ecosystem (adapted from
Ostrom et al. 1994 with permission from The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA).
Theoretical framework
Propositional conceptualization of rigid institutional regimes
For the purpose of the analysis presented here, which has an
exploratory and systemic character, institutional regimes were
conceptualized as the on-the-ground matrix of institutions,
organizational structures, and epistemological domains that
define policy formation, decision-making procedures and
required action or outcomes for the accomplishment of a
certain societal function, in this case, WRM and WC (based
on Gunderson et al. 1995, Holling and Meffe 1996, Ostrom
2005, Hotimsky et al. 2006, Pahl-Wostl 2007, Fischer-
Kowalski and Rotmans 2009). We chose to organize the
analysis using the Institutional Analysis and Development
framework (IAD) (Figure 1; Ostrom et al. 1994), due to its
descriptive power, analytical versatility and theoretical
interoperability (Clement 2010, Poteete et al. 2010).
According to it, institutions are the formal and informal
prescriptions (i.e., rules-in-use) about what actions or states
of the world are required, prohibited, or permitted. Actors use
these prescriptions to organize repetitive and structured
interactions while participating in action situations within the
regime’s action arenas, at three different levels (see Fig. 1).
Institutions are considered as an exogenous variable of the
arena; other exogenous variables include the biophysical
system being acted upon, in this case Doñana’s hydro-
ecological system, and the culture of the community (Ostrom
2005). The latter is a very broad and relevant concept,
considered as an institution itself by sociological disciplines
(see Hall and Taylor 1996). For this analysis, we considered
epistemological domains (e.g., scientific-technical approaches,
traditional ecological knowledge) as a sufficient observable
element for understanding the formation of the RIR and left
out the more general concept of culture, which will be analyzed
in subsequent studies of the current institutional configuration.
Organizational structures (e.g., management and enforcing
agencies, property systems) were considered as a response to
the institutional matrix of the system (sensu North 1990a),
occurring at the action–arena level. 
Insights and evidence about Doñana drawn from the literature,
as well as our own informal observations and comparisons
(“empirical puzzles”, sensu Thelen 1999) over two decades
of field work in both the ecological and social grounds (e.g.,
Santamaría et al. 1996, Santamaría and Amezaga 1999,
Amezaga and Santamaría 2000), led us early in 2006 to think
that the region fitted the features of a pathological WSES.
Through inductive reasoning, we therefore assumed the
presence of rigid institutions for WRM and WC based on top-
down, command-and-control approaches (see also Gómez-
Baggethun and Kelemen 2008). Subsequently, we started to
develop, following a deductive approach, a formal and testable
conceptualization of rigid institutions on the basis of pre-
existing concepts from the literature (see e.g., “prediction and
control regime”; Moberg and Galaz 2005, Pahl-Wostl 2007).
We crystallized this conceptualization under the term rigid
institutional regime (RIR hereafter) and established its
fundamental properties by integrating the main features
defining command-and-control approaches, namely: 
● Decision making and required actions or outcomes are
determined hierarchically and top-down (i.e., authoritatively). 
● Public participation and, more specifically, actor
involvement processes are determined narrowly and
passively. 
● Power distance, individualism, avoidance of uncertainty,
and short-term maximization (vs. long-term optimization)
are promoted. 
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Fig. 2. The adaptive cycle. Modified from Holling and Gunderson (2002) with permission from Island Press, Washington, D.
C., USA.
● The recurrent generation of structural entities (e.g.,
infrastructure for water control) in which maintenance
costs exceed their long-term benefits. 
The adaptive cycle
Evidence from case studies of regional development and
resource use has shown that complex adaptive systems
undergo cyclic, multistate catastrophic behavior (Levin 1998)
that fit an adaptive four-phase cycle, along which structural
changes among the system’s descriptive properties, i.e.
potential, connectedness, and resilience (Figure 2) (Holling
1986, Gunderson et al. 1995, Gunderson and Holling 2002).
Although the adaptive cycle is a heuristic that was originally
applied to resource systems and ecosystems, it has been
generalized to coupled social-ecological systems and single
social systems (e.g., institutional regimes), which would
undergo, in principle, similar phases (Table 2) (Holling and
Gunderson 2002, Allison and Hobbs 2004, Cumming and
Collier 2005, Walker and Lawson 2006, Beier et al. 2009,
Bunce et al. 2009, Daedlow et al. 2011). We postulate that the
Doñana’s regimes for WRM and WC fitted the adaptive cycle
at least once through their histories; hence, the structural
changes in the system’s descriptive properties (potential,
connectedness, and resilience) can be used to describe the
forces that shaped the behavior of such regimes.  
The meaning of resilience, in particular, can be approached
from two different perspectives: “engineering resilience”
(Holling 1996) and “ecological resilience” (Holling 1973).
While the first focuses on the notion of time for recovering
after disturbance, i.e., returning to equilibrium (Walker et al.
2004), the second focuses in the probability of multiple stable
states, and is defined as the capacity of ecosystems “to absorb
disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to
still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity,
and feedbacks”, a definition that may be applied to the socio-
ecosystem as a whole (Walker et al. 2004). From the latter, it
can be derived a definition of “institutional resilience” that is
instrumental for the purposes of our analysis: the capacity of
institutional regimes (“resilience of what”) to withstand
external disturbances (e.g., environmental perturbation,
political changes; “resilience to what”) without losing the
performance capacity for the accomplishment of the societal
function for which that they were devised (after Adger 2000,
Carpenter et al. 2001, Perrings 2006, Baral et al. 2010, Smith
and Stirling 2010).  
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Table 2. Description of the four phases of the adaptive cycle and the associated changes in the system's descriptive properties:
potential for change, connectedness, and resilience (Gunderson and Holling 2002).
Phase Description Potential for change Connectedness Resilience
α (reorganization) - System widely open to reorganization
- Experimentation and initial establishment of
actors, organizations and institutions, strongly
subjected to evolutionary forces (i.e., competition,
failure, survival)
- Loss of resources (e.g., energy, information) is
minimized, so that they become available in r
phase (legacies)
- Great uncertainty about options for the future and
chance for unexpected forms of renewal
Relatively high for future
development.
Low. Internal regulation
and control over external
variability is weak.
High. Wide stability
region and weak
regulation around
equilibria.
r
(exploitation and
rapid growth)
- Innovators perceive unlimited opportunity
- Bases for entrepreneurial and market competition
are settled
- External variability remains, favorable to entities
more adapted to it (r-strategists)
- Incremental exploitation of available resources
and growth
- Actors develop capacity for controlling external
variability, hence reinforcing their own expansion
- Future starts to be more predictable
Declines as resources
start and continue to be
exploited.
Still low, but starts to
increase, along with
stability.
Remains high due to the
adaptation to high
variability.
K
(consolidation and
conservation)
- Growth rate slows down
- Reduced opportunity and difficulties for new
entrants
- The future seems ever more certain and
determined
- Competitive edge shifts to those that control
variability (K-strategists)
- Increasing returns from efficiency (e.g.,
minimizing costs, streamlining operations)
- Organizations become bureaucratized, rigid and
internally focused (i.e., blind to external changes)
Becomes high again in
terms of stored capital
Increases as system
becomes highly stable
and over-connected in
structural and
organizational terms,
hence more rigid (less
flexible).
Rapidly declines, i.e.,
vulnerability to external
disturbance starts to
increase.
Ω
(release)
- Extreme structural rigidity that may trigger
sudden change, collapse and a “creative
destruction” phase (Schumpeter 1950)
- Chaotic behavior, uncertainty rules govern
- All of these create the source for reorganization
and the systems begin to acquire a new identity
Suddenly declines as
previously accumulated
resources are abruptly
released and exhausted.
High, but connections
and regulatory controls
are suddenly broken.
Low, but rapidly
increases as the system
moves towards the next α
phase of reorganization.
We consciously excluded from our framework the work on
panarchical (i.e., cross-scale) interrelationships and
maladaptive traps (e.g., rigidity and poverty trap, Holling et
al. 2002; lock-in trap, Allison and Hobbs 2004), to avoid
potential biases in our interpretations. Instead of including the
traps a priori in our theoretical framework, we decided to let
the potential patterns of such traps arise analytically and, in
such case, discuss them a posteriori and lay the foundations
for further research needs. Our aim was to avoid the selective
use of theoretical concepts or the imposition of an explanatory
framework upon data analysis (sensu Layder 1998).  
Institutional path dependence
Path dependence is a highly abstract concept that cannot be
established independent of theory, and must be previously
objectified. We undertook such a task through the coherent
integration of concepts borrowed from both economics and
historical institutionalism. According to them, institutional
regimes can be understood as entities impacted, at certain
points in history, by the effect of two types of events: (1) At
so-called “critical junctures”, strong systematic forces may
have fundamental impacts on the regime’s subsequent
dynamics (Thelen 1999). Depending on the way they occur,
they may produce radical or incremental changes that result
in a diversity of institutional configurations, therefore shaping
large political or economic development transitions in the long
run (Collier and Collier 1991, Hacker 1998, Mahoney and
Thelen 2010); (2) At any point in history, including at critical
junctures, seemingly small events may have disproportionate
consequences (i.e., exhibit nonlinearity) due to self-enforcing
mechanisms (Hacker 1998). These mechanisms are often
characterized by what economists know as “increasing
returns” (North 1990b, Arthur 1999), highlighting how the
probability of events throughout a historical path increases
with each step until an equilibrium configuration is reached
(Mahoney 2000). 
In the first case (critical junctures), path independence is
expected: change occurs in response to certain mechanisms
(e.g., negative feedback, competitive selection) that preclude
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deviations from configurations logically expected by
operating theories, the most salient ones being those based on
neoclassical economic principles, the so-called efficiency
baseline (Hacker 1998, Mahoney 2000).  
In the second case, “increasing-returns” mechanisms entail
positive feedbacks that may increase the probability of
occurrence of certain institutional arrangements. Once such
arrangements prevail, they are very resistant to change, that
is, they are “difficult to exit from” (North 1990b) and may
lead, in turn, to lock-in situations in which a “winning”, stable-
equilibrium configuration becomes very costly to reverse –,
regardless of the efficiency of alternative, even probable,
configurations (Pierson 1993, Ikenberry 1994, Hacker 1998,
Thelen 1999). Ultimately, such a configuration enters a path
of institutional development characterized by institutional
reproduction and continuity, which may become further
reinforced by: (1) the structural constraints of its immediate
past (e.g., infrastructure, institutions), or (2) the subsequent
decisions, choices and coordination efforts exerted by on-the-
ground, inner actors through agency (e.g., policy networks,
lobbies) in ways that reflect and reinforce the “inherent logic”
of the system (Thelen 1999, Mahoney 2000).  
These processes are path dependent and have the following
fundamental properties (North 1990b, Arthur 1994, Arthur
1999, Thelen 1999, David 2000, Mahoney 2000, Pierson
2000):  
● Self-enforcing mechanisms, such as: (1) large setup or
fixed costs, which create a high pay-off for further
investment in a single option, (2) learning effects, if
knowledge gained in the recursive operation over the
resource system or ecosystem leads actors to be more
efficient and get higher returns from continuing use, (3)
coordination effects, if the individual benefit increases
as others adopt the same option, and (4) functional, power
and legitimation mechanisms. 
● Contingency. Theory is unable to explain, either
deterministically or probabilistically, the emergence of
the resultant institutional outcomes on the basis of their
initial conditions, i.e., owing to their inefficiency as
compared with alternative outcomes, current outcomes
are not logically expected. 
● Timing and sequencing. The order of events may be
determinant, since early events have larger effects than
later ones. 
● Inertia. Once in place, winning configurations can remain
“on stage” in the absence of the forces that originated
them due, for example, to institutional reproduction
mechanisms. 
Hypotheses
We completed our theoretical framework by deducing a
specific hypothesis (h
1
) addressing the causal mechanisms
underlying the genesis of the assumed institutional outcome
(i.e., the RIR), and complemented it with a working hypothesis
(H
1
) that will guide our long-term inquiry. Both hypotheses
were stated as follows: 
h
1
: The historical persistence of command-and-control
approaches is a path dependent process that has led to the
emergence of a rigid institutional regime in the Doñana water
socio-ecosystem, and caused it to enter and get trapped in a
pathological stable state. The null hypothesis (h
0
) would be
that of process path independence. 
H
1
: The development of action-research programs is
instrumental for implementing adaptive management at the
operational levels in pathological WSES, since it facilitates
the long-term transition from RIR to more flexible and
adaptive institutional regimes for WRM and WC. The null
hypothesis (H
0
) would be that of non-instrumentality of action
research.
Data collection, categorization and analysis
Qualitative historical data (hereafter referred to as
“institutional events”) were collected from a number of
historic accounts about the Doñana WSES or about relevant
events affecting it, included in grey and published literature
(see Appendix 1). We classified and structured the raw data
using directed, deductive content analysis (see e.g., Hsieh and
Shannon 2005). We used a broad conceptual categorization
matrix, composed of two nominal categories (key institutions
and main policy, economic, organizational and scientific-
technical features), crossed with the historical period at which
each institutional event took place (based on classical
denominations of Spanish historiography, see e.g.,
Domínguez-Ortiz 2000). The nominal categories constituted
integrative surrogates to both observe the general components
of the institutional regimes (i.e., institutions, organizational
structures, and epistemological domains) and infer the
propositional features (e.g., hierarchical decision making,
power distance, “white elephants”) that characterize RIRs at
a more abstract level of analysis. After the elaboration of the
systems narrative (see Systems Narrative section), we
complemented the historical profile of the matrix with the
identification of corresponding phases of the adaptive cycle
(cycle’s phase). The complete matrix is presented in Appendix
1. 
Data analysis and interpretation (i.e., systems narrative
construction; see e.g., Allison and Hobbs 2004) were
performed in a back-and-forth fashion between both stages.
This recursive process allowed us to become familiarized with
the data, while looking for evidence and patterns that matched
or mismatched our theoretical propositions. Specifically, we
focused on: 
● The identification of adaptive cycle phases fitting the
evolution of the WRM and WC regimes. 
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● The description of the dynamics of their descriptive
properties (potential, connectedness, and resilience),
with a specific focus on institutional resilience. 
● The identification of critical junctures and their effects
over the historical trajectory of both regimes. 
● The search for proof of path dependence (e.g., self-
enforcing mechanisms), specially with reference to
command-and-control, technocratic approaches. 
● The qualitative evaluation of h
1
. 
● The development of a historical criterion for actor
analysis, to be subsequently used in the action-research
program (see Appendix 2).
SYSTEMS NARRATIVE: HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION
We firstly present two separated narratives for the period
between the end of the 18th century and 1969, which
respectively interpret the foundation and development of the
Doñana’s institutional regimes for WRM and WC. Secondly,
we present a joint narrative for the period 1970-2000, which
interprets how both regimes operated separately, but in
synchrony, due to their common foundation upon command-
and-control institutional approaches (see Figure 3 for a
diagrammatic representation of the narratives, including
examples from the most salient institutional events). Thirdly,
we present a narrative for the period 2000-2008,
contextualizing the current characteristics of both regimes
within the Los Frailes mining accident and our long-term
research program.
From the end of the 18th century until 1969
Water resource management
The intensive transformation of Doñana did not start until the
1920s; however, the roots of its current institutional regime
for WRM can be traced back to the end of the 18th century. At
that time, organizational structures for water planning and
management in the Guadalquivir Estuary were still based on
the implementation of scattered projects for the construction
and maintenance of a rudimentary infrastructure for water
distribution and use, i.e., on the marginal control of water.
Overall, the ruling regime was characterized by a rather stable,
self-sufficient and sustainable economy based on local and
traditional ecological knowledge, which had limited impacts
on the estuary’s hydro-ecological system. Such a regime
corresponded to the last stages of an r-K phase (Figure 3, point
1), during which local pioneers (r-strategists) became adapted
to external variability, expanded incrementally and
accumulated capital from the extraction of water resources,
until reaching a stable exploitation pattern in which
competition was starting to take place. The ensuing K phase
was arranged around an archaic property system and formal
institutions empowering the governing nobility (K-strategists)
to regulate and organize the use of water resources. 
At this stage, the regime showed limited resilience to: (1) the
national, enlightened-absolutist socioeconomic trends of the
époque, which promoted navigability and economic
development in the estuary; and (2) the top-down,
constitutional, deficit-driven impositions enforced by State
officials. We argue that this was caused by two main
mechanisms. On the one hand, internal stability was disturbed
from inside, particularly at the operational level, where a
number of key private entrepreneurs effectively promoted
their view of the entire hydro-ecological system as an
underexploited region with enormous potential (i.e., low-
released capital). On the other hand, the regime was
characterized by a general void of inter-scale, collective-
choice action arenas (e.g., “weak socioeconomic structures”,
Moral-Ituarte 1991) for the cooperative definition of more
equitable formal rules for resource use and management (e.g.,
uniting the governing nobility and the local administrations).
This void precluded the development of interconnected
decision making processes and multilevel action arenas within
the regime, i.e., it resulted in low connectedness that lowered
its institutional resilience.  
In system terms, the institutional regime lacked the necessary
internal regulation and control for absorbing external
disturbances, and was highly sensitive to the free will of some
internal entrepreneurs. This resulted in a system-wide
institutional collapse (Ω phase; Fig. 3, point 2), after which
the entrepreneurs started to target the large-scale modification
of the hydro-ecological system, and to progressively
restructure the regime around a novel, alternative
configuration (α phase; Fig. 3, point 3). The first plans and
projects aiming at the transformation of the estuary into
navigable watercourses and the marshes into productive
cropland were developed. Although they were not
implemented immediately in Doñana (e.g., disentitlements
were only applied to surrounding scrubland and forest
properties), they represented the first organized attempts to
turn the region into an economically productive land, a
Schumpeterian “creative destruction” phase (Schumpeter
1950:83). 
By the mid 19th century, the regime had entered a new r phase
(Fig. 3, point 4), characterized by the positive feedback
between new constitutional institutions and local events.
Royal governments transferred common property rights to
actors at lower, collective choice and operational levels,
allowing them to dedicate large individual and cooperative
efforts to promote the new economic productivity
perspectives, from both the public and the private sectors.
During the second half of the century, this process was
reinforced by new institutions and strategies, including the
progressive increase of organized middle class actors and
sophisticated technological projects, necessary to tackle the
high investment costs and long-term recouping required for
the transformation of marshland into irrigated cropland.  
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Fig. 3. Historical development of Doñana's institutional regimes for water resource management (WRM) and wetland
conservation (WC), interpreted through the adaptive-cycle heuristic, and concomitant changes in institutional resilience.
Dates and description profiles of institutional events are provided in Appendix 1.
At the end of the 19th century and the outset of the 20th, the
regime started to stabilize around a K phase (Fig. 3, point 5),
with the support of newly formed institutions at the
constitutional level and intellectual-scientific movements that
encouraged large hydraulic modifications at the national level
(regeneracionismo, see e.g. Orti 1984). During this period, the
social and economic costs and risks associated with
technological failures did not seem to represent a major
limiting factor for actors at the collective choice and
operational levels. For example, the deficiencies in the public
infrastructure that defended the inflowing, channeled rivers in
the surroundings of the Doñana marshlands resulted in several
floods characterized as disastrous that ravaged the impoldered
lands and colonial towns from 1892 to 1916, and broke down
new dikes built with private funding in 1927 (Enggass 1968).
Dikes were however rebuilt, heightened, and reinforced in the
entire area (e.g., by the Guadalquivir Marshes Company for
rice cultivation) without apparent detectable revision of the
underlying strategies (Enggass 1968, González-Arteaga
2005). Similarly, the projected economic targets for the
production of irrigated lands (e.g., cultivation of cereals,
commercial crops, and forage) were not met due to lack of
Ecology and Society 17(1): 26
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss1/art26/
adequate infrastructure for reducing soil salinity and draining
regularly flooded farmland, compounded by the fragmentary
planning and uncoordinated work (Enggass 1968). However,
both these targets and the agronomic planning behind them
remained uncontested (Enggass 1968, González-Arteaga
2005). 
In other words, the recurrent impact of natural disasters and
the low economic performance of the production systems did
not challenge the existing, on-the-ground approaches for
WRM, owing to the strong institutional support for the
implementation of new technologies. Thus Ω phases were not
followed by α phases of destructuration and renewal. These
phases are indicated as Ω' to emphasize the absence of α phases
(Fig. 3, point 5), and the reestablishment of the K phase after
them (Fig. 3, point 6). This whole period followed the collapse
of the Ancient Regime and coincided with the Spanish Liberal
Reform (1833-1870s) and Liberal-State Consolidation
(1870s-1920s) periods (see Appendix 1). It can be
conceptualized as a broad critical juncture (CJ1; see Fig. 3),
characterized by incremental change and the quasi-sequential
accumulation of institutional events depicted in Table 3.  
The regime-level processes described so far suffered an almost
complete collapse (depicted again as a Ω’ phase; Fig. 3, point
7) during the Civil War but, immediately after it, recovered
momentum swiftly and returned to the pre-existing K phase
(Fig. 3, point 7). This phase became further stabilized by a
diverse set of reinforcements at the constitutional level,
underpinned by institutional legacies from the past that
persisted at different levels. For example, during the 1940s,
the regime gradually shifted from being based on communal
lands and public property, to a mixed public-private system
led and controlled by the engineers of the new authoritarian
government, who promoted further the drainage-canalization-
colonization strategy established during the previous decades.
Furthermore, in 1944, the Guadalquivir River Authority (a
State organization created in 1927) presented for the first time
a coordinated plan for the canalization and drainage of the
Guadiamar River, aimed at halting its discharge into the
Doñana marshes. The project had been backed by pre-war
institutions (e.g., Gasset Act of 1911) and benefited, at this
later time, from the development of existing infrastructure. 
The post-war regime thus resumed the intensive exploitation
of the region, and expanded its focus from agriculture and
water resources into forest resource policies and institutions,
including the development of extensive eucalyptus
afforestations aimed at providing raw materials for industry.
The development of new drainage projects for agriculture was
fuelled by the synergies from other economic sectors that
participated in the development processes, the all-time records
of the Spanish GDP during the late 1940s, and the nation-wide
autarchy imposed by Franco, which emphasized national food
security and supply self-sufficiency. In the 1960s and 1970s
these developments, described by some authors as a land
reclamation process (Engass 1968), favored the north-to-south
colonization of the Guadalquivir River’s right bank territories,
including about 2/3 of the Doñana marshes.
Table 3. Main institutional events characterizing CJ1.
1. Inherited, inter-scale institutional void between nobility elites
and local administrations.
2. Establishment of the bases for the development of local and
foreign trade, by enhancing, for example, navigation in the
Guadalquivir River.
3. Diversification of, and increase in, the productivity of
communal lands (e.g., establishment of pine tree plantations
for the production of energy, construction material, and coal).
4. Allocation of exchange value, mainly to Guadalquivir River’s
left bank marshlands (e.g., creation of farmland and related
industry around municipal entities).
5. Provision to wealthy, middle-class private actors (r-strategists)
of easy access to title deeds of indivisible properties (large
estates) and smallholdings, favoring large investments of
capital for land purchase and the establishment of a nascent
middle class (economic policies for Liberal-State
consolidation).
6. Settlement of the contemporary public debt of the
Government Treasury (tax policies).
7. Implementation of new public infrastructure and innovative
engineering technologies aimed at intensifying production and
maximizing returns.
8. Spanish economy leaving behind a period of decline. All-time
records of the GDP during the 1920s.
In summary, in the period comprised between the 1920s and
the 1960s, the institutional regime for WRM increased its
resilience owing to the maintenance of the former production
and engineering schemes, the changes in the property system,
and the increasing interventionism and bureaucratization of
the State. The regime became fully stabilized in a K phase
dominated by K-strategists (Fig. 3, point 7). 
Wetland conservation
Spain’s institutional regime for nature conservation probably
has its foundational constitutional event in the passing of the
National Parks Act of 1916. Among the various models of
conservation available at the time, governmental authorities
selected the top-down implementation of a National Parks
system. New room emerged for pioneers to fulfill the
institutional developments demanded by the new conservation
paradigms. An entirely new institutional regime for nature
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conservation was purposely created and connectedness among
officials and pioneer entrepreneurial actors began to increase.
During a short, α-r phase (Fig. 3, point 8) new organizational
structures were created and empowered to operate at the
national level, taking elements and techniques from the
conservation regimes of other Western countries (such as the
USA), but necessarily subservient to the powerful forestry-
and civil-engineering corps, which systematically excluded
from protection “unproductive lands”, i.e., marshland/
wetland ecosystems. The incipient institutional regime for
nature conservation became rapidly dominated by policies and
operational techniques already in place for the exploitation of
forests, game, and fish. 
Although the Spanish Civil War halted the development of
nature conservation policies (Ω’ phase; Fig. 3, point 7), the
tandem National Parks/ Forestry Policy persisted after it as the
preferred operational model at the national level. Following
the top-down, constitutional implementation of new
institutions (e.g., Forestry Heritage Act of 1941, Forestry Act
of 1957), the regime for nature conservation and forest
resource management became increasingly bureaucratic and
rigid, and focused almost exclusively on maximizing
economic returns. Hence, it rapidly entered a K phase (Fig. 3,
point 9).  
In spite of the strong rigidity characteristic of K-phase
institutional configurations, small crises and reorganization
may be triggered by groups of actors, self-organized in
coalition networks, which benefit from “windows of
opportunity” to introduce novelty (i.e., small Ω-α phases
triggered by Ω-α groups; Gunderson et al. 1995, Olsson et al.
2006). This was the case in Doñana. During the 1950s and the
1960s, perhaps due to its early establishment as one of the
most important waterfowl reserves in Europe at the end of the
19th century, a growing awareness of the necessity to safeguard
the conservation of its marshland/ wetland ecosystems built
up, at both national and international levels.  
A careful analysis of historical events shows that, in parallel
to the development of the institutional regime for nature
conservation, a small Ω-α group of actors from the scientific
sector (e.g., J. A. Valverde, F. Bernis), informally organized
at the operational level, became aware of the unstoppable
degradation of Doñana’s marshland/ wetland ecosystem and
started an effective lobbying campaign to introduce a new set
of protection policies for their conservation (Fig. 3). These
policies were not the result of a strategic analysis and decision
making in the public policy sector, but the work of a network
of private pioneers and strategists who raised ecological
awareness at the societal level and triggered new policy
formulations (Valverde 2004).  
A Ω-α group that succeeds in achieving change and
introducing novelty often benefits from key reinforcements
by powerful external groups (Gunderson et al. 1995). In
Doñana, several international organizations supported the Ω-
α group with key knowledge and funding (e.g., the
International Union for Conservation of Nature, IUCN, and
the International Waterfowl and Wetlands Research Bureau,
IWRB). The lobbying and fundraising campaign reached a
peak with the constitution of the World Wildlife Fund for
Nature (WWF), the acquisition of large areas of marshland
and surrounding forests, and the creation of the Doñana
Biological Reserve and Doñana Biological Station (Fernández
and Pradas 2000b, Valverde 2004). Indeed, the creation of the
WWF was an unexpected international repercussion of the
local, protection-for-conservation struggle. The Doñana
Biological Station received the constitutional mandate of
conducting research and managing the Doñana Biological
Reserve, and a sizable portion of the original marshland and
dunes were included in the new Doñana National Park (Act
of 1969).
From 1970 to 2000
During the 1970s, both regimes entered a new phase, during
which novel α-type attempts to harmonize WRM and WC
took place. In 1978, after the constitutional replacement of
Franco’s authoritarian government by a democratic one, the
new Doñana National Park Act of 1978 (hereafter Doñana
Act) established novel operational guidelines for conservation
inside and outside the park, demonstrating for the first time,
de jure, the public interest in the conservation of its aquatic
ecosystems. The new institution seemingly laid the
foundations for the consolidation of the WC regime and the
collapse of the old WRM regime. However, the old
technocratic organizations, paradigms, and institutions
maintained their top-down, command-and-control approaches
and their focus on engineering works. Thus, the institutional
regime for WC entered, after this short period (which can be
characterized as a failed Ω’-α phase, Fig. 3, point 10), a stable
K phase in close synchrony with the WRM regime (Fig. 3,
point 11). 
In our view, this was due to three main mechanisms that
coincided with another critical juncture (CJ2; see Fig. 3)
during the 1960-1970 period of progressivism and transition
to democracy (see Appendix 1). Firstly, the management-for-
conservation institutions and organizational structures were
co-opted by the old-fashioned engineering lobby, which
dominated the public sector and still endorsed the previous
management-for-productivity, command-and-control framework.
During the 1960s, the Forestry Directorate lived a struggle of
power between pro-conservation engineers and old-school
ones, focused exclusively on economic productivity
(Fernández and Pradas 2000a). Pro-conservation engineers
received the support of the Doñana Biological Station, but the
struggle was dominated by the established, old-school
engineering lobby by 1971, when the Forestry Directorate and
the Forestry Heritage merged to become the Nature
Conservation Institute (ICONA; Fernández and Pradas
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Fig. 4. Evolution of Doñana’s hydraulic system between 1900 and 2000.
2000a). By 1974, J. A. Valverde, the most significant
champion of the Doñana’s protection-for-conservation race,
was replaced by an old-school engineer as director of the
National Park (Valverde 2004).  
Secondly, the Doñana Act consolidated the dominance of the
engineering lobby in the management of the National Park.
The direction of the National Park and the Biological Reserve
were respectively assigned to the ICONA (Ministry of
Agriculture) and the Doñana Biological Station (Spanish
Research Council, Ministry of Education). Both agencies
received separate mandates: ICONA should manage the Park,
while the Doñana Biological Station should guarantee
scientific research and monitor its conservation. The
conservation of the Doñana marshes, therefore, became
dependent on the institutional relationships between the
Doñana Biological Station and the ICONA, which
personalized the existing tensions among conservationists and
old-school engineers (Valverde 2004).  
Thirdly, this period was characterized by the promotion of
intensive development in the immediate surroundings of the
National Park, which was clearly at odds with its long-term
purpose and objectives. Governmental agencies, supported by
a blooming national economy, continued acquiring more
territory, draining wetlands and marshes to gain agricultural
lands (e.g., rice cultivation; González-Arteaga 2005), and
developing irrigation schemes to feed them with both surface
and groundwater. As a consequence, the last strides of pristine
marshes in the immediate vicinity of the recently created
National Park were transformed; the hydraulic system that fed
the Park’s marshes was drained, diverted, controlled, or
canalized; and the Doñana marshes became progressively
dependent on a completely artificial water management
regime, which has lasted until today (Figure 4).  
During the 1980s and the 1990s, the synchronized K-phase
regimes proved their ever-increasing institutional resilience
by surviving several Ω-type crises (Fig. 3, point 12),
including: 
● the operational crisis caused, in the late 1980s, by the
defective design of the Doñana Hydraulic Regeneration
Plan, which failed to restore the intended water inflows
and left behind inefficient infrastructure (e.g., channels,
sluices; Casas and Urdiales 1995); 
● the ecological, operational and political crisis caused by
the recurrence of massive waterfowl mortalities, during
the early and mid 1980s (“botulism crises”, Amezaga and
Santamaría 2000, Fernández-Delgado 2006); 
● the ecological, operational and political crisis caused, in
1998, by the accident at Los Frailes metalliferous mine,
which contaminated the Guadiamar River and the
Doñana Natural and National Parks (Grimalt et al. 1999,
García and Marín 2006). 
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None of these crises resulted in the introduction of significant
innovative changes within the regimes, at any institutional
level. Paradoxically, they resulted instead in the reinforcement
of command-and-control approaches, the increase of the
regimes’ institutional resilience and their recursive recycling
in a permanent Ω'-K phase (Fig. 3, point 13) that increased
further the risk of new social-ecological collapses.  
On the basis of our historical interpretations, we argue that the
developments of the outcome regimes during the last decades
of the 20th century can be characterized by:  
● high stability; 
● top-down, hierarchical decision making and passive
public participation processes; 
● reduced opportunity for innovation; 
● highly bureaucratized, rigid, atomized, and internally-
focused organizations in which power distance has been
promoted; 
● an intensively modified hydraulic system sprinkled with
inefficient infrastructure; 
● a contest of perspectives about the perceived problems,
spinning tightly around an economic development vs.
nature conservation dichotomy (see also Palomo et al.
2011); 
● a highly subsidized economy, based on a few agricultural
options (e.g., rice and strawberry cultivation) and
continuously threatened by both endogenous (e.g., water
shortages) and exogenous factors (e.g., market drift)
(González-Arteaga 2005). 
Especially relevant is the current hydraulic regime of the
remaining marshland/wetland ecosystems protected within
the current Doñana Nature Reserve, which largely depends
upon artificial management (Fig. 4). For example, water is
controlled via a surrounding clay dam equipped with outflow
channels and sluice gates, and the flooding regime is halted
by early June to prevent waterfowl mortalities triggered by
botulism (Casas and Urdiales 1995, Clemente et al. 2004,
García and Marín 2006).
From 2000 to 2008
During the first decade of the 21st century, the institutional
regimes for WRM and WC have been fundamentally
influenced by the public shock caused, in 1998, by the
previously mentioned Los Frailes mining accident. This
accident provided impetus for the application of two hydro-
ecological restoration projects, implemented separately by the
regional (“Guadiamar’s Green Corridor”, 1998-2002; Montes
2002) and national (“Doñana 2005”, 1998-2006; García and
Marín 2006) Ministries of Environment. In both cases, the
projects explicitly acknowledged the need for new alliances
between science and management, and opened a window of
opportunity for the promotion of new institutional
configurations. There was enough flexibility for enrolling a
wide range of stakeholders and developing new forms of
participation and management at the operational levels (e.g.,
adaptive management, participatory action research; see G. K.
Meffe, T. Dunne, and J. B. Zedler 2002, unpublished report,
Montes 2002, Arenas et al. 2003, Escalera 2003, Santamaría
et al. 2006). However, the inertia of the former institutional
regime progressively compromised these initiatives and, after
a period of creativity largely restricted to the declarative phase,
both projects returned to top-down models of organization and
implementation, largely based on the endorsement of civil
engineering-based works (see, e.g., the post-implementation
views reported in Arenas 2003 and Arenas and Carrascal 2004,
in which references to adaptive and participatory approaches
are conspicuously absent, or the specific restoration works
reported in García and Marín 2006).
DISCUSSION
h1 evaluation: implications for theory
Our analytical interpretation indicated that, if theories based
on the efficiency and productivity baseline are used (e.g.,
neoclassical economic theory), h
1
 can be validated. Our data
show, indeed, that the current RIR (i.e., institutional outcome)
is characterized by system-wide (institutional, organizational,
and epistemological) inefficiency in its current societal
function, which requires the integration of economic
development, water resource management (WRM), and
wetland conservation (WC) goals. The RIR is not, therefore,
a necessary or expected outcome of the institutional events
that occurred during the first critical juncture (CJ1), during
which the implementation of command-and-control
approaches responded to a search for economic efficiency and
productivity.  
If novel frameworks, based upon resilience and adaptive
change disciplines, are used, h
1
 can also be validated.
However, its evaluation requires the inclusion of an additional
conceptual layer to our theoretical framework, hence a more
elaborated argumentation. Our analytical interpretations
support the characterization of Doñana’s RIR as path
dependent. The institutional regime for WRM once fit the
adaptive cycle, between the end of the 18th century and the
outset of the 19th. Based on our theoretical framework, this
was logically expected and predicted to occur, therefore, it
represented a path independent event. However, from that
moment to the present, the institutional regime for WRM
twirled recurrently in a persistent Ω’-K phase; and the
emerging WC regime was quickly synchronized to this
dynamic. This recurrence cannot be predicted by the adaptive
cycle theory, at least in its simplest form. But, was it
completely unpredictable?  
If we consider, in retrospective, the theory on maladaptive
traps that departs from the adaptive cycle (Holling et al. 2002),
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the establishment of a RIR is theoretically probable. Indeed,
a RIR fits the features of a rigidity trap fairly well, e.g., a high
potential for change, connectedness, and resilience (see
Allison and Hobbs 2004). But the existence of a probable
outcome does not necessarily imply that it is a predictable
consequence of a given set of conditions. In Doñana, the
institutional regime for WRM could have stabilized following
CJ1 around three feasible alternative configurations, namely:
(1) an adaptive regime that completed, at least, a second
adaptive cycle, (2) the chaos trap (high potential, but low
connectedness and resilience; Loring 2007), and (3) the lock-
in trap (low potential, but high connectedness and resilience;
Allison and Hobbs 2004).  
In the first case, the inference is straightforward: actors learn,
after the Ω’-type crises, the long-term inefficiencies of
command-and-control approaches and, instead of promoting
institutional reproduction, they foster institutional innovation
and restructuring on the basis of the lessons learnt (i.e., α 
phases). In the second case, certain constraints (e.g., the non-
existence of public funding, such as in the period prior to CJ1)
deprive command-and-control approaches of their initial
advantages, which results in a backlash or breakdown of the
institutional regime (sensu Brugge and Rotmans 2007) and its
return to a previous configuration, based for example on a
structurally weak and low-resilient, self-sustainable economy
(which fits the features of the chaos trap; see Loring 2007). In
the third case, the regime enters a path in which the whole
ecological system becomes irreversibly modified for
economic productive purposes, losing its most important
ecological and hydraulic components, and posing high sunk
costs (i.e., it enters a lock-in trap; see Allison and Hobbs 2004).
 
Our interpretations show that none of these alternatives
crystallized. Instead, the regime stabilized around a rigidity
trap, foreseen by theory but unpredictable on the basis of the
preceding events, making the outcome path dependent. During
CJ1, several alternative configurations, especially the lock-in
trap, seemed to be equally probable; it was only after CJ1 that
the regime began to stabilize around the rigidity trap. We now
turn to a discussion of why.
Historical mechanisms underlying institutional rigidity
After CJ1, the winning institutional configuration was one
imbued with institutional arrangements based upon command-
and-control approaches for WRM at the estuary level. These
arrangements, focused on economic/ organizational efficiency
and the maximization of productivity, appeared to have
competitive advantages over alternative approaches (e.g., self-
sufficient economies based on traditional ecological
knowledge). They capitalized on their advantages during the
early periods of the juncture and became locked in within the
institutional regime in posterior periods.  
In our view, the lock-in of command-and-control at the
operational levels was facilitated by several self-enforcing
events, characterized by “increasing-returns” mechanisms and
favored by past structural flaws (e.g., initial inter-scale
institutional void). These mechanisms operated before and
during the 1920s, despite the verified inefficiency of the
approach (Ω’-type crises). The most clear example involves
the actors’ expectations about the returns on investments in
innovative technologies, agricultural development, and
engineering works supported by public funding. Incremental
investments in public and private infrastructure led to large
set-up costs that created, in turn, increasing payoffs for further
investments in infrastructure and transformative technologies.
As they gained experience and knowledge from the recursive
operation over the hydro-ecological system, actors were
affected by learning and coordination effects, and benefited
increasingly from the extension of command-and-control
approaches to water resource management and marshland/
wetland transformation (i.e., actors were r-strategists). 
In this way, the winning institutional configuration entered a
developmental path characterized by the top-down
reproduction of institutions aimed at reinforcing the array of
command-and-control approaches developed at the
operational level. Such institutions sought to recoup costs and
incentivize the streamlined operation of the existing structures.
In fact, they reinforced the on-the-ground investments for the
transformation of Doñana’s hydro-ecological systems into
productive lands and waters, as well as their intensive
exploitation.  
The persistence of such institutional configuration during all
subsequent periods, despite the existence of several windows
of opportunity for the promotion of new institutional
configurations (e.g., Ω-α group action, Doñana Act of 1978)
and more Ω’-type crises, was rooted in its strong inertia and
the power of technocratic elites (i.e., K-strategists). Such elites
legitimated and supported, from the constitutional level and
through institutional reproduction mechanisms, an inherent
institutional logic that curtailed reorganization and renewal.
This was done, for example, by changing the property system,
increasing interventionism and bureaucratization at all levels,
or replacing local change champions. In other words, the
institutional events that took place prior (Autarchic period)
and during CJ2 reinforced the system’s path dependence, and
the trajectory of the Doñana’s WSES entered a pathological
rigidity trap characterized by high potential for change, high
connectedness, and high resilience. 
Why not a low-potential lock-in trap? Firstly because, contrary
to other regions where lock-in traps have been described
(Allison and Hobbs 2004), the Doñana WSES has retained
part of its wetland/ marshland ecosystems isolated in a Nature
Reserve, owing to the innovative action of the Ω-α group
during the 1950-60s. In other words, it has retained a sizable
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part of its structural and natural capital. Secondly, because the
window of opportunity opened after the Los Frailes mining
accident allowed the proactive introduction, by several
independent actors, of bits of innovation within the regime
(for example, promotion of novel, learning-by-doing and
participatory approaches for hydro-ecological restoration;
Escalera 2003, Santamaría et al. 2006). In our opinion, these
two factors leave sufficient scope and opportunities for the
development of a flexible and adaptive institutional regime,
more independent of historical factors and better suited to
return Doñana’s WSES to a more healthy and sustainable state.
Preliminary insights from the action-research program
The results of the historical analysis informed the design of
our action-research program, which we regarded as an
indispensable step for a transition toward more flexible and
adaptive regimes over the long term. The program was tailored
to: (1) generate networking and build trust among the various,
disconnected, often competing agencies in charge of WRM
and WC, and (2) to inform the development of small-scale,
successful examples of adaptive management at the
operational level (Santamaría et al. 2006). In particular, the
use of an action-research approach allowed us to introduce
new modes of actor involvement (actor analysis and
interviews) and promote a collaborative understanding of the
challenges facing Doñana’s WRM and WC (workshops). We
will now provide a number of preliminary insights derived
from it, with an emphasis on the research management
workshop that culminated it (see Appendix 2 for a detailed
description of the specific methods used in the program, which
took place from 2006 to 2008). A complete analysis of the
interviews (e.g., trust evaluation, management narratives),
current policy and legislation will be presented elsewhere.  
Our historical analysis indicated that Doñana’s institutional
regimes for WRM and WC developed, over time, disparate
strategies that deepened the conflict between water resource
management and wetland/ marshland conservation. This
problem was formalized and discussed at the research
management workshop. The workshop revealed that the
different actors held contrasting mental models about WRM
and WC, which included different perceptions about nature
(nature in static equilibrium vs. constantly evolving nature) or
about the procedures for making decisions (hierarchically vs.
collectively). During the sessions, facilitated through Group
Model Building, these differences were made explicit,
collectively discussed and accommodated in shared models.
Participants were organized in two thematic groups (water and
vegetation) and requested to identify first-order and second-
order drivers of change towards the accomplishment of a main
goal, involving, in both cases, sustainable performance (Table
A2.4; output models are provided in Figs. A2.2 and A2.3).
Sources of uncertainty were subsequently identified; they
included gaps in ecological and socioeconomic knowledge,
complex ecosystem behavior, unpredictable reactions of
society to management decisions, unexpected political
developments (such as changes in EU policies), and climate
change. Uncertainties were then scored for importance and
urgency. Climate change was scored as the “most worrying”
source of uncertainty in both sessions; however, it was not
considered the most urgent. Instead, participants assigned the
highest priority to actions addressing: (1) the lack of
knowledge about the hydrological system, and (2) the
unpredictable reactions of society to management decisions.  
A preliminary analysis of the interviews and workshops led
us to the realization that their combined use constituted a
powerful tool to identify and develop, informally and
collectively, unexpressed ideas that had remained tacit but
were broadly accepted (e.g., the existence of large power
differences between individuals within management agencies,
expressed by most actors from the operational levels). The
combined use of thematic talks, facilitated discussion, and
Group Model Building proved also to be instrumental for the
participatory identification of future steps and initiatives
toward institutional change (summarized in Table 4). Finally,
it is worth noting that action-research initiatives represent a
demanding task requiring updated knowledge about the case
study, in situ social capital, strong commitment, resilience to
short-term failure, and considerable social/ emotional skills,
particularly since those involved in them usually enter a locked
conflict as “external insiders” (see Appendix 2), and must
navigate the risk of being involuntarily involved in the conflict
themselves.
GROUNDED SPECULATION AND FURTHER
RESEARCH NEEDS
Our historical analysis and the preliminary insights from the
action-research program suggest that the statutory backing of
the European Water Framework Directive (WFD) could
provide the momentum needed for an innovative change in
Doñana’s WSES. For example, one of the conclusions of the
management workshop was the need to draw specific plans
for the wider catchment area influencing the Doñana Nature
Reserve, complemented by the separate delimitation of the
subbasin (with a specific management plan) directly
influencing the Doñana wetlands. Article 13.5 of the WFD
states that River Basin Management Plans may be
supplemented by the production of more detailed programs
and management plans for sub-basins, to deal with particular
aspects of water management. The directive also requires
special attention for protected areas, which have to be
registered (Article 6 and Annex IV) and covered by adequate
monitoring programs (Article 8).  
Furthermore, participatory processes similar to those of our
action-research program could become the cornerstone of the
process of public information and consultation required by
Article 14, in the spirit of the widening participation proposed
by the WFD guidelines (WFD Common Implementation
Ecology and Society 17(1): 26
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Strategy 2003). Our reasoning could be generalized to
comparable cases, in which key protected nature reserves
including wetlands are important elements of a river basin.
Such participatory processes could provide both a solid
interface with a whole range of stakeholders, and a platform
for the dynamic interaction between research and
management.
Table 4. Shared list of recommendations to foster the
improvement of the research–management interface in
Doñana.
1. The transparent definition of shared management goals and
functioning models of Doñana Nature Reserve’s (DNR)
marsh/ wetland ecosystems.
2. The structuring of existing monitoring programs, based on
established goals and functioning models, and seeking to
optimize coordination among agencies.
3. The incorporation of social research and public participation
into policy making and management plans.
4. The definition, within the new Management Plan of the
Guadalquivir River Basin, of a specific sub-basin for the DNR
wetlands and its tributaries. Such a definition would resolve
the contradiction inherent to the declaration of most river
branches flowing into or surrounding the DNR as highly
modified watercourses (therefore free from the obligation of
achieving a good ecological status).
5. The continuation and enhancement of the collaborative
dynamics that emerged after the Los Frailes mining accident.
These dynamics are broadly perceived as a social good, which
should be promoted both politically and economically.
6. The improvement of mechanisms for information exchange
and inter-agency goal definition among the Doñana Nature
Reserve, the Doñana Biological Station and the Guadalquivir
River Authority. Examples include the development of
protocols, standards, joint committees, virtual workspaces,
and corporate databases for mutual support and joint decision
making.
7. The stepwise introduction of learning, novelty, and innovation
into management, based on the transfer of knowledge
generated in well-defined pilot projects and programs.
In the Doñana case, future research aimed at guiding managed
transitions must be based on collaborative analyses of the
current institutional configuration at different levels, focusing,
for example, on the role of culture, or the impact of current
policies and legislation upon the management at operational
levels. For this purpose, our theoretical framework could be
best complemented by using updated versions of the IAD as
a meta-conceptual framework (Poteete et al. 2010), cross-scale
interrelationships (panarchy heuristic; Gunderson and Holling
2002) and managed transitions (transition arenas; Brugge and
van Raak 2007). As a final note, we would like to stress the
importance of continuing the micro-analyses of cross-
disciplinary teams implementing action-research programs, a
research topic that has been addressed in other recent articles
(see e.g., Daniell et al. 2010, Huitema and Meijerink 2010,
Moellenkamp et al. 2010).
CONCLUSIONS
The historical persistence of command-and-control
approaches for water resource management and wetland
conservation is a path dependent process that led to the
emergence of a rigid institutional regime in the Doñana water
socio-ecosystem, and caused it to enter a pathological stable
state that can be characterized as a rigidity trap. Doñana still
retains a high potential for change in the form of structural and
natural capital, which opens considerable opportunities for
managed transitions towards more flexible and adaptive
institutional regimes. Our analysis shows how the heuristics
posed by adaptive change theories, complemented with
concepts borrowed from institutional theory, can be used to
understand and describe the trajectory of institutional regimes,
as well as to evaluate and generate theory, thus increasing our
predictive power. Historical analyses such as the one presented
here may serve the purpose of informing and guiding the
design of action-research programs aimed at facilitating
transitions in rigid institutional regimes.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss1/art26/
responses/
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APPENDIX 1. Resultant matrix from data collection and categorization. 
Cycle’s phase    
WRM WC Period Key institutions Main policy, economic, organizational, and scientific-technical features characterizing each period 
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Ancient Regime – Local nobility entitled by royal governments or local agreements 
to use highly-valuable resources and to regulate the use of the less valuable by 
the civilian population. Non-regulated activity of hunters and collectors 
1778 – Free Trade Decree promoting the reviving of trade at the State level. Seville 
and Cádiz lose their monopoly 
1781 – Founding of the Friends of the Country Society of Sanlúcar de Barrameda 
(ancient province in which Doñana was included) for the promotion of economic 
development in the region 
1794 – Royal Order allowing for the implementation of the first large-scale 
infrastructure in the Guadalquivir Estuary for enhancing navigation, the 
Merlina’s meander cut (1795) 
1798 – First Disentitlements allowing the expropriation of clergy’s wealth (e.g., 
Jesuits, Charity Institutions) 
Planning and management based on scattered projects, maintenance of rudimentary infrastructure and 
cleaning of natural, accessible water courses 
Property system based on multi-functional, community-based or municipal properties for agricultural 
activities and low water consumption regimes, immersed in larger crown and nobility properties  
Increasing State public deficit  
Reviving of the promotion of navigation in the Guadalquivir River (navigability tests, blueprints and 
mythology revival), after Seville’s loss of trade monopoly and under the Enlightenment’s Spirit of 
Reform  
Beginning of a disentitlement (nationalization-for-privatization) process of low-productivity lands for 
increasing their productivity 
First public works for enhancing navigation and river defense. Marginal agricultural development  
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 1805 – Promotion Plan of Sanlúcar Province. First technical planning for the 
transformation of region, but almost no practical implementation 
1814 – Royal Order allowing for the constitution of the Guadalquivir Navigation 
Royal Company, preceded by several navigability tests, topographical surveys 
and planning  
1818 – Transaction to the Guadalquivir Navigation Royal Company of one of the 
largest marshland territories (Isla Menor) 
1819/1849 – Two acts promoting irrigation agriculture among smallholders through 
tax exemption 
1833 – Forestry Bylaws establishing the first protection system for forests 
Persistent public deficit, but availability of private investment capital  
Developing of formal, but inconsistent policies and investment plans promoting the Guadalquivir Estuary 
and the surrounding left- and right-bank marshlands as a territory with a high commercial and economic 
potential (navigation, agriculture, colonization, mining) 
First works modifying the Guadalquivir River course, through meander cuts and the introduction of 
innovative industrial and engineering technologies (steam engine, mining). These processes are 
paralleled by the first attempts for drainage and agricultural development, which failed  due to lack of 
adequate technology (e.g., left-bank Isla Menor marshlands) 
Public works for enhancing the Guadalquivir’s navigability, granted to companies participated by private 
shareholders (e.g., Guadalquivir Navigation Royal Company)  
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1851-1852 – Series of Royal Orders settling the project for making the 
Guadalquivir’s navigable  
1855 – Madoz Disentitlement nationalizing low-yield lands for privatization 
1859-1862 – Series of State regulations entitling Forestry Engineering corps to 
catalogue excludable areas from the disentitlement process, partly alleviating 
forests from devastation (Forestry Catalogue) 
1865 – Creation of the Hydrographic Demarcations 
1866 – Water Act declaring water of public domain 
1870 – Channels and Reservoirs Act granting large public-works companies 
perpetuity  rights on the use of infrastructures in which they had invested  
Increasing sale and/or public auction of properties (marshlands, scrublands and forests) of the so-called 
‘dead hands’ (clergy and nobility) and beginning of extensive forestry operations (including extensive 
clear-cuts) across the State, owing to the disentitlement process (agricultural and paper-industry 
development) 
Agrarian Technical Reform at the State level – Increasing application of innovative technologies (e.g., 
impoldering) for the enhancement of agricultural productivity, based on middle-class and corporate 
private capital. High investment costs and long term recouping (land adaptation to irrigation and crop 
transformation) slows down technology implementation  
  Increasing  promotion of the need for water control (meander cuts, defense works) and regulation in the 
Guadalquivir Estuary (legal system) for enhanced navigation, communication, flood control and disease 
prevention  
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1870 – Royal Order promoting drainage engineering projects at the Lebrija marshes 
(most of them finished in 1928, due to inadequate planning and the priority 
given to navigation policies) 
1877 – Act for the enhancement and afforestation of public forests excluded from 
the disentitlement process 
1877 – Royal Order granting the first large-scale drainage works within the Doñana 
marshlands , at  Aznalcázar´s Marisma Gallega (failed and reinstated in 1910) 
1879 – Water Act giving priority to irrigation agriculture over navigation at the State 
level –end of laissez-faire policies. 
Middle-class  actors (naturalists, ornithologists and hunters) promote the Doñana marshes for naturalistic 
and hunting purposes (e.g. first expeditions of A. Chapman and W.J. Buck) and contribute to 
establishing its reputation as one of the most important waterfowl reserves in Europe (e.g. A. Machado 
y Núñez, H. Saunders, and Lord Lilford) 
Emergence of an intellectual-scientific movement termed ‘Regeneracionismo’, aimed at understanding the 
political, scientific, social and economic causes of Spain´s political and economic decline, largely in 
response to the loss of Spanish overseas territories 
Sustained conflicts between Civil and Forestry engineers, rooted in the poor discrimination of their 
respective responsibilities and their contrasting approaches to planning and management 
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1901 – Creation of the Hidrographic-Forestry Demarcations, precursor of the 
Water Authorities (1926) 
1907 – Colonization Act halting emigration and promoting the cultivation of low-
yield lands 
1908 – Protective Forestry Act promoting afforestation of public and private forests 
1911 – Large Irrigated Lands Act (Gasset Act) establishing the State as the financer 
and promoter of large public works 
1916 – National Parks Act in 1916 creating the National Park’s Trust Boards 
1917 to date – Battery of regulations implementing the park-based model 
1924 – Royal Order of Ministry of Promotion granting a private financial group the 
drainage and exploitation rights of the Hinojos marshes (~10,000 ha.) 
1926 – Royal Decree for the creation of the modern water authorities.  
1927–  Creation of the Guadalquivir River Authority 
Key figures of the ‘regeneracionismo’ describe regional differences in water availability as the main 
shortcoming for the development of irrigation agriculture, and promote a revised hydraulic-forestry 
policy as the panacea for economic development 
Beginning of the forestry protection-for-conservation policies and regulations in Spain. The Forestry 
Engineering Corps are entitled to catalogue areas to be protected from colonization and exploitation. 
Increasing links between nature (forests) conservation and forestry policies  
High GDP in Spain during the 1920s 
Increasing State interventionism through hydraulic policies and planning (e.g., National Hydraulic Plans 
of 1902 -Gasset Plan- and 1933), subsequently defended in several National Irrigation Congresses 
(1913, 1918, 1921, 1927, 1934) and paralleled by colonization strategies 
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1932 – Irrigation Act increasing the State responsibilities in the development of 
secondary and complementary public works 
1935 – Forest Heritage Act promoting large afforestations with production purposes 
Republican attempts for increasing public property in Doñana by declaring the marshes of ‘public 
interest’. However, lobbying by powerful stakeholders and private owners still succeed at promoting the 
drainage of several hectares of marshes for the culture of rice intended to supply the military 
Beginning of an intensive shift in jurisdiction in the private-property system, which increasingly goes to 
the State 
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1940 – Act entitling Forestry Engineering Corps for heading National Parks 
planning and management 
1941 – Restitution of Forest Heritage Act declaring Huelva province (including 
Doñana) region of interest for forestry 
1957 – Forestry Act entrusting the State Ministry of Agriculture with the 
stewardship of nature conservation and promoting production-driven planning 
and technologies 
 
1940s – Increasing improvement of the Spanish economy – high GDP 
1940s-1950s – First large-scale projects in Doñana, backed by the Gasset Act of 1911 (e.g. drainage of the 
Guadiamar River by the Guadalquivir River Authority, executed by public-private contract)  
1950s – Massive afforestation projects promoted at the State level, both for production (Forest 
Heritage/Ministry of Agriculture) and for conservation (Directorate of Forestry/Ministry of 
Agriculture).  
* Franco’s dictatorship 
Data collected from (in alphabetical order; see Literature Cited): Andrés-Gallego 1981, Borja et al. 2001, Casas and Urdiales 1995, Clemente et al. 2004, Cortázar and Vesga 1994, Cruz 1996, Demerson 1976, Enggass 1968, 
Fernández and Pradas 2000a, Fernández and Pradas 2000b, Fernández-Albertos and Manzano 2010, Fernández-Delgado 2006, García and Marín 2006, García-Viñas et al. 2005, Gómez-Baggethun and Kelemen 2008, 
Guadalquivir River Authority 2010, Llamas 1988, Montes et al. 1998, Moral-Ituarte 1991, Moreno 1992, Ojeda 1992, Ojeda and Moral-Ituarte 2004, Orti 1984, Tomás y Valiente 1978, Valverde 2004, Zouwen 2006.  
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1969 – Doñana Act creating the Doñana National Park (DNP), preceded by the 
purchase of 6,700 ha of marshlands by the World Wildlife Fund and the creation 
of the Doñana Biological Reserve and Doñana Biological Station (1964) by the 
Spanish Research Council 
1971 – Decree dictating the merger of the Forest Heritage and the Directorate of 
Forestry within the Nature Conservation Institute (ICONA), which takes charge 
of the DNP’s stewardship 
1972 and 1974 – Two Decrees entitling the Institute for Agrarian Reform and 
Development (IRYDA) to implement large transformation projects in the 
marshes surrounding the DNP 
1975 – Nature Reserves Act increasing the decision power of local administrations, 
land owners and the ICONA within the DNP’s Trust Board, and favouring the 
agricultural projects of the IRYDA 
1950s-1960s – First scientific expeditions of key national and international scientists (e.g., J.A. Valverde, 
F. Bernis), naturalists (e.g., G. Mountfort) and ornithologists (e.g., Roger T. Peterson)  to the Doñana 
marshes, supported by private owners (e.g., M. González) who constituted key stakeholders in the 
protection-for-conservation processes 
1970s – Implementation of the Almonte-Marismas Plan and Guadalquivir-FAO Project (preceded by the 
discovery and delimitation of the Almonte-Marismas aquifer) for the drainage of 35,000 ha of deltaic- 
and marsh-lands in Doñana, carried out by the IRYDA  
1970s – Beginning of a long phase during which the conservation of the Doñana marshes depended on the 
organisational and personal relationships between the Doñana Biological Station and the ICONA, 
which was itself facing an internal power-contest between pro-conservation and old-school engineers 
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 1978 – Spanish Constitution replacing the authoritarian government by a democratic 
government 
1978 – Doñana Act increasing the Park’s surface (50270 ha), and establishing novel 
guidelines for conservation inside and outside the park, and assigning the 
direction of the National Park and Biological Reserve to the ICONA (Ministry of 
Agriculture) and the Doñana Biological Station (Ministry of Education), 
respectively 
1970s – 1978 Doñana Act extending the Park’s surface, to include a strip of marine areas; launching a 
policy of expropriations to consolidate the public domain over most of its land; instituting an Use and 
Management Plan; setting the path for the establishment of a Master Plan for the regional coordination 
of socioeconomic development (e.g., road networks, tourist planning, agricultural and stock farming 
practices) and nature conservation; and allowing for the creation by law of the Doñana Natural Park 
buffering the core National Park (Nature Reserves Inventory Act of 1989). 
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1981 – First Doñana Hydraulic Regeneration Plan aimed at the restoration of the 
main tributaries to the marsh (Guadiamar and Travieso Channels) and the 
modification of the Guadalquivir River levee, allowing to control the marsh 
inflow and discharges by means of sluices 
1983 – Water Act implementing the Hydraulic Public Domain 
1984 – First Director Plan of Use and Management of the National Park  
1988 – First Director Territorial Plan of Doñana establishing a framework inter- 
organisational and stakeholder coordination in regional planning, and policy 
development and implementation 
1989 – Nature Reserves Inventory Act creating the Doñana Natural Park (54250 ha) 
buffering the core National Park and the Andalusian Nature Reserves Network, 
henceforth stimulating and reinforcing the nature conservation legal system, and 
its protection standards and protocols 
1993 – First Doñana Sustainable Development Plan  
1998 – “Los Frailes” mining accident 
1999 – Doñana Nature Reserve Bill aimed at taking over the DNP’s management 
1980s-1990s – Top-down drastic reductions in the irrigable surfaces established in the plans of the prior 
decades, which become more intensively used due to technological advances 
1980s – First, failed hydraulic regeneration projects in Doñana 
1970s-1990s – The DNP, fed by intensively modified tributaries and streams, is affected by progressive 
degradation and punctuated by ecological crises (e.g., waterfowl mortalities, biological invasions, mine 
pollution) and withstands a considerable number of pressures and threats both outside (e.g. irrigated 
agriculture) and inside (e.g. overgrazing by cattle and introduced herbivores, high risk of botulism 
outbreaks, deforestation of the inflowing stream basins with subsequent erosion of the banks) 
1990s –  First Sustainable Development Plan: increasing adaptation of the development policies to a 
changing reality, by developing compatible economic and conservation goals  
1998 – Mining accident at Los Frailes, after which the Spanish government and the Andalusian 
government launched the Doñana 2005 and Guadiamar Green Corridor restoration projects respectively  
1980s-2000s – The Andalusian Regional Government engages, and finally wins a political and judicial 
contest to claim jurisdiction over the Doñana National Park from the Spanish (central) Government 
 
APPENDIX 2. Detailed description of the specific methods used in the action-research 
program
Action research is a methodology based on the collaboration of the researchers and those actors 
who are at the focus of the research (Susman and Evered 1978, Robson 2002). It is adequate for 
solving intricate, complex social problems through the collaborative understanding of their 
underlying causes, as well as of the institutional and organizational change needed to realize such 
solutions (Robson 2002). In applying this methodology, we assumed that the intervention of 
“external insiders” with the social expertise needed to promote and facilitate participative and 
inclusive processes of change, through the use of specific, qualitative methods (Robson 2002), 
could be instrumental in facilitating the transition from rigid to more flexible and adaptive 
institutional regimes for water resources management and wetland conservation in Doñana. We 
employed the following methods: 
Actor identification (11/25/2006-05/22/2007)
Actor identification consisted in the selection and categorization of actors on the basis of previously 
established criteria (Table A2.1). In particular, we used the historical criterion elaborated after the 
analysis presented here, Mostert’s four criteria for stakeholder identification (Mostert 2006:163), 
and the three levels of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD; Kiser and 
Ostrom 1982, Ostrom 1999, Ostrom 2005). Such criteria allowed us to classify actors in two 
categories: decision makers (actors with enough power to make a final choice among alternatives in 
policy making or project implementation processes) and stakeholders (actors who can affect or are 
affected by the achievement of new policy or project goals, or by those of the action-research 
program).  
Table A2.1. Criteria used for the selection and categorization of actors in our case study.  
Historical criterion 
He/She or his/her organization has historically participated in the past or recent development 
of the institutional regimes for water resources management or wetland conservation in 
Doñana. 
Mostert’s criteria 
A. He/She possess relevant information about the case study. 
B. He/She can actively contribute to the development of new policy or projects. 
C. His/Her interests will be directly affected by the action-research program and any 
potential process of change. 
D. He/she can obstruct decision making or frustrate policy or project implementation. 
IAD’s levels of inquiry  
A. Constitutional level (constitutional decisions, actions and rules directly affecting the 
collective-choice level). 
B. Collective-choice level (collectively-chosen decisions, actions and rules directly 
affecting the operational level). 
C. Operational level (day-to-day decisions, actions and rules directly affecting water 
management and/or wetland conservation). 
Following these criteria, we identified a total of 40 actors, of which 34 where finally contacted (the 
other 6 were either unavailable, retired or on sabbatical). 25 of them were available for interviewing 
in the first phase (1h on average by the same researcher), 7 took part in the uncertainty workshop, 
and 24 took part in the research-management workshop (though only 15 participated in the Group 
Model Building session; see Table A2.2 and the Workshops section below). All actors (38% 
decision makers, 62% stakeholders) met our historical criterion, and at least two of Mostert’s 
criteria at any of Ostrom’s levels. Decision makers met at least three specific Mostert’s criteria (B, 
C and D) (Table A2.2). Key decision makers predominantly belonged to agencies with direct 
management duties over the Doñana Nature Reserve, such as its Administration Office (Regional 
Ministry of Environment), the Doñana Biological Station (Ministry of Education and Science) and 
the Guadalquivir River Authority (Ministry of Environment). Stakeholders included officers from 
the Andalusian Ministry of Environment (Andalusian Water Agency and Nature Reserves 
Network), academics from (national and Andalusian) universities and research agencies, and the 
WWF.
Table A2.2. Identified actors (UW = uncertainty workshop, RMW = research-management workshop, DM = decision 
maker, SH = stakeholder). 
  Criteria and category  
ID Organization Historical Mostert Ostrom Category Interview UW RMW 
A1 Doñana Nature Reserve Yes A, B, C, D A, B, C DM Yes No Yes 
A2 Doñana Nature Reserve Yes A, B, C, D B, C DM Yes No Yes 
A3 Doñana Nature Reserve Yes A, B, C, D B, C DM Yes No Yes (+) 
A4 Doñana Nature Reserve Yes A, B, C, D B, C DM Yes Yes No 
A5 Doñana Nature Reserve Yes A, B C SH No No Yes (+) 
A6 Doñana Biological Station Yes A, B, C, D A, B, C DM Yes No No 
A7 Doñana Biological Station Yes A, B, C B, C DM No No Yes 
A8 Doñana Biological Station Yes A, B C SH Yes No Yes 
A9 Doñana Biological Station Yes A, B C SH Yes No No 
A10 Doñana Biological Station and Reserve Yes A, B, C, D B, C DM Yes No Yes (+) 
A11 Doñana Biological Station Yes A, B C SH Yes No No 
A12 Doñana Biological Station and Reserve Yes A, B C SH Yes No Yes (+) 
A13 Doñana Biological Station Yes A, B, C, D B, C DM Yes No No 
A14 Doñana Biological Station Yes A, B C SH No No Yes 
A15 Doñana Biological Station Yes A, B C SH Yes Yes Yes (+) 
A16 Doñana Biological Station Yes A, B, C, D B, C DM Yes No No 
A17 Doñana Biological Station Yes A, B C SH Yes Yes Yes (+) 
A18 Doñana Biological Station Yes A, B C SH No No Yes (+) 
A19 Doñana Biological Station Yes A, B C SH No No Yes (+) 
A20 Doñana Biological Station Yes A, B C SH No No Yes 
A21 Guadalquivir River Authority – Water 
Planning Office 
Yes A, B, C, D  A, B, C DM No Yes Yes (+) 
A22 Guadalquivir River Authority – Seville Area 
Office 
Yes A, B, C, D A, B, C DM Yes Yes Yes (+) 
A23 Andalusian Water Institute – Doñana 2005 
Project
Yes A, B, C, D A, B, C DM Yes No No 
A24 Andalusian Water Institute – Doñana 2005 
Project
Yes A, B B, C SH No Yes No 
A25 Andalusian Water Agency – Doñana 2005 
Project
Yes A, B B SH Yes No Yes (+) 
Table A2.2 (cont’d). Identified actors (UW = uncertainty workshop, RMW = research-management workshop, DM = 
decision maker, SH = stakeholder). 
  Criteria and category  
ID Organization Historical Mostert Ostrom Category Interview UW RMW 
A26 Andalusian Water Agency – Doñana 2005 
Project
Yes A, B C SH Yes No No 
A27 Andalusian Nature Reserves Network – 
Directorate General 
Yes A, B, C, D A, B, C DM Yes No Yes 
A28 University of Seville – Doñana 2005 Project Yes A, B C SH Yes No Yes (+) 
A29 University of Seville  Yes A, B C SH Yes No Yes  
A30 University of Huelva – Doñana 2005 Project Yes A, B C SH Yes No Yes (+) 
A31 University of Córdoba – Doñana 2005 Project Yes A, B C SH Yes No No 
A32 Polytechnic University of Catalonia – Doñana 
2005 Project 
Yes A, B C SH No No Yes 
A33 Institute for Prospective Technological 
Studies (European Commission's Joint 
Research Centre) 
Yes A, B C SH Yes No No 
A34 WWF/Adena Doñana Office Yes A, B, C A, B SH Yes No Yes (+) 
- Mediterranean Institute for Advanced Studies 
– Doñana 2005 Project 
†
- - - - - Yes - 
- Sierra Nevada Nature Reserve - - - - - - Yes (+) 
Totals 34 (latter two excluded from count) 13 DM (38%) and 21 SH (62%) 25 7 24 (15) 
(+) Actor that stayed and participated in the GMB (third) session of the RMW. 
† L. Santamaría was invited externally by organizer N. Insendahl to participate in the UW (co-organized with P. F. Méndez), before she joined 
the research program; both then acted as organizers together with P. F. Méndez and J. Amezaga in the RMW.
Semi-structured, open-ended interviews – question guides (06/19/2007-10/26/2007)
1. What is the function of your organization? 
Primary themes (non-consecutive, alternative):
- Function in the field of water resources in the Guadalquivir Estuary. 
- Function in the field of wetland conservation in the Guadalquivir Estuary. 
- More specific function within the Doñana Nature Reserve. 
2. What type of organization is it (public, private, non-profit)? 
3. Which are your duties within your organization? 
4. What is your general perspective about water resources management in Doñana and the 
Guadalquivir Estuary? 
Primary themes (subsequent and consecutive):
- General perspective and opinion. 
- EU’s policies and legislation. 
- National and regional policies and legislation. 
- Research and management. 
- Operational management. 
5. What is your general perspective about wetland conservation in Doñana? 
Primary themes (subsequent and consecutive):
- General perspective and opinion. 
- EU’s policies and legislation. 
- National and regional policies and legislation. 
- Research and management. 
- Operational management. 
Let´s talk about the “Doñana 2005” Eco-Hydraulic Restoration Project. 
6. What problem was being assessed?
7. What is your general perspective about the management of the Doñana 2005 Project? 
Primary themes (subsequent and consecutive):
- General perspective and opinion. 
- Research and management. 
- Operational management. 
8. More specifically, what is your general perspective of the restoration action carried out at 
the Caracoles Estate which, as you might know, was designed under adaptive management 
tenets? 
Primary themes (subsequent and consecutive):
- General perspective and opinion. 
- Research and management. 
- Operational management. 
We define institutions as “the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of organized, 
established, social procedures (formal and informal rules, organizations, epistemological 
domains and technologies)” (Brief explanation of definition and specific elements if requested). 
9. Which were the main opportunities and barriers that such action encountered in the 
institutional realm?  
Primary themes (non-consecutive, alternative):
- Formal (e.g., legislation, policies) and informal rules (e.g. innovation networks, lobbies). 
- Organizations (e.g., research organizations –universities, institutes–, management agencies). 
- Scientific-technical perspectives (as a surrogate of epistemological domains; e.g., command-and-control 
approaches, ecosystem-based and adaptive management). 
- Technologies (e.g., information technologies). 
Workshops
Uncertainty workshop (12/05/2007) 
The uncertainty workshop aimed at preliminarily identifying uncertainties in water management 
and nature conservation in the Doñana Nature Reserve and the Guadalquivir Estuary from the 
perspective of practitioners. It was held as a focus group, involving 7 key actors for water 
management and conservation in the Guadalquivir estuary. The workshop first assessed how the 
participants perceived and framed uncertainty. In an open discussion, they identified several 
situations of uncertainty relevant to their professional work and, on the basis of these situations of 
uncertainty, shared parameters were interactively developed making use of the card-sorting method. 
During the workshop, the need to explicitly take uncertainties into account was made explicit and a 
reflection process about the approaches required to make such realization operative was instigated. 
The workshop showed that there is a considerable variety of uncertainties that actors in water 
management have to deal with. Their conceptualization by the different actors was explicitly 
captured and reflected in a final list of 13 uncertainty situations (Table A2.3). This exercise and the 
derived set of parameters constituted a first step towards making approaches for dealing with 
uncertainty more explicit and structured in our case study (see Isendahl et al. 2010 for a more 
detailed description of the workshop organization and results).
Table A2.3. Uncertainty workshop. Upper panel:  situations of uncertainty relevant to the professional work 
of the participants. Lower panel: shared parameters. 
Situations of uncertainty 
1. How to communicate uncertainties to the public? 
2. How to set priorities when dealing with several uncertainties? 
3. How would the marshlands react to the removal of the dike? 
4. What are the socio-economic consequences of the WRM in the region? 
5. What do we know about the natural system (marshlands)? 
6. What Doñana/marshlands do we want? 
7. What is the security of an economic investment? 
8.      Have I considered all uncertainties? 
9. How does the society react on a management decision? (example Agrio reservoir and question of 
distribution of water) 
10. How does the agricultural sector evolve (e.g. effects of Common Agricultural Policy change)? 
11. How do the different interests affect decision-making in management? 
12. How to predict the medium recharge of the aquifer? 
Shared parameters 
1. Capacity to tackle the uncertainties 
2. Type of uncertainty/sectoral structure    
3. Urgency/Priority to deal with the uncertainties  
4. Conceptual clarity/knowledge about the problem or the uncertainty 
5. Level of action  
6. Recognition of the uncertainty as such by the public  
7. Strategy to tackle the uncertainties  
8. Capacity to assess the unforeseen consequences of the uncertainty 
9. Cause of the uncertainty 
Research-management workshop (04/02/2008) 
The research-management workshop involved a group of 24 of the identified actors (Table A2.2) 
and focused on the improvement of the research-management interface in the Doñana Nature 
Reserve and the Guadalquivir Estuary. As has been shown, it constitutes a critical element in the 
region, due to the historical weight of the competitive (often conflictive) trade-off between water 
resources management and wetland conservation goals. Prior to the workshop, and based on our 
preliminary analysis of the interviews and the results of the uncertainty workshop, the following 
management and governance problems were listed in a whiteboard (placed visible and presented to 
all the participants at the outset of the workshop): 
- The absence of a strategic framework for the region. 
- The lack of water management and wetland conservation goals. 
- The lack of a shared model of the structure and functioning of the Doñana wetland ecosystems. 
- The ignorance of key uncertainties. 
- The absence of pre-defined goals for monitoring programs (in spite of their long-term and 
coordinated character). 
- The absence of evaluation and learning mechanisms (institutions, protocols, standards, 
coordinating individuals, champions, etc.). 
The workshop was divided in three parts. Firstly, we introduced our action-research program and 
presented adaptive management as a potential tool to introduce dynamism and learning capacity 
into the research-management interface. As an example, we provided an overview of the challenges 
and successes faced by a number of projects that had applied adaptive management elsewhere (with 
an emphasis on British Columbia, Canada; see Méndez et al. 2010 for a review). We also 
summarized the results of the uncertainty workshop.
Secondly, we organized four thematic talks (about nature conservation, research, water management 
and hydro-ecological restoration), presented by key decision makers and followed by facilitated 
discussion. In the discussion, several problems related to conservation, research and water 
management in the Doñana Nature Reserve emerged. The session concluded with the synthesis of 
such problems, their conversion into objectives and the elaboration of a shared list of 
recommendations to foster the improvement of the research-management interface (see Table 4 
from main text).  
Thirdly, we organized a session of participatory modeling (with only 15 of the initial participants, 
owing to agenda constraints of the rest) that was performed in two separated groups, respectively 
focused on two key components of the management of Doñana’s aquatic ecosystems: water and 
vegetation. These elements had been identified during the preceding interviews and historical 
analysis, as being both central to the management of these ecosystems and inter-related to most 
other relevant elements. We used Group Model Building as a method facilitating the sessions 
(Vennix 1996, Andersen et al. 1997). Each group, guided and moderated by a facilitator, worked on 
jointly building one causal model following a classic approach – focusing on simple mechanisms to 
build causal relationships (see Vennix 1996). Both models were then presented in a plenary session 
and used for group discussion.
The “water-management group” built a model aimed at achieving “sustainable water management 
regimes that ensure the long-term conservation of the biodiversity hosted by the Doñana Nature 
Reserve marsh/wetland ecosystems” (Fig. A2.1), whereas the “vegetation management group” built 
a model aimed at achieving “the sustainable management of the vegetation of the Doñana Nature 
Reserve marsh/wetland ecosystems (and its grazers), in order to assure the conservation of the 
biodiversity hosted by them” (Fig. A2.2). Participants were asked to identify first-order (directly 
influencing the main goal) and second-order (directly influencing first-order factors) drivers of 
change towards the accomplishment of the main goals (Table A2.4). Additional goals during the 
discussions were (1) to work towards a shared understanding of water management and nature 
conservation in the Doñana region, and (2) to collectively identify options of institutional change. 
Finally, both groups were asked to identify key sources of uncertainty in the modeled subsystems 
(water and vegetation) – which were contrasted with those reported in the uncertainty workshop.
Table A2.4. Synthesis of first-order and second-order causes recognized as drivers of change towards the 
accomplishment of the main goal, by the participants in the research-management workshop’s Group Model Building 
sessions.
Session Main goal First-order causes Second-order causes 
Water Sustainable water 
management regimes that 
ensure the long-term 
conservation of the 
biodiversity hosted by the 
DNR’s marsh/wetland 
ecosystems. 
- The improvement of knowledge on 
ecosystem functioning. 
- The promotion of social dialog in 
the affected region. 
- The clear definition of management 
and conservation criteria (e.g. water 
quantity and quality needs). 
- The improvement of inter-agency 
and trans-disciplinary coordination. 
- The management of the ‘Doñana 
sub-basin’
- The implementation of long-
term monitoring programs. 
- The free availability and transfer 
of results from these programs. 
- The development of standards 
and technologies for information 
sharing and transference. 
- Socioeconomic research. 
- Political support (was envisaged 
as instrumental) for the 
elaboration of collective, shared 
management and conservation 
criteria.
- Environmental education (driver 
of change affecting the whole 
model). 
Vegetation Sustainable management of 
the vegetation of the DNR’s 
marsh/wetland ecosystems 
(and its grazers), in order to 
ensure the conservation of 
the biodiversity hosted by 
them. 
- The adjustment of the herbivore 
load to the temporal fluctuations 
and spatial variation in the marsh’s 
carrying capacity. 
- The adequate implementation, on 
the ground, of the DNR’s planning 
and management instruments. 
- The collective building of a 
system’s functioning model 
(including hydrologic, climatic and 
vegetation dynamics). 
- The introduction of preventive 
management strategies (e.g. risk 
management, prevention and 
control of alien species). 
- The establishment of water quantity 
and quality criteria. 
- The reduction of erosion through 
hydraulic restoration of streams. 
- The improvement of agricultural 
planning. 
- The re-evaluation and 
improvement of the existing 
legal instruments.  
- Knowledge generation and 
information gathering through 
research and monitoring. 
- Environmental education (driver 
of change affecting the whole 
model). 
- Future reforms of EU’s policies 
(e.g., Water Framework 
Directive, Common Agricultural 
Policy) (driver of change 
affecting the whole model). 
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